An enchantment by the proprietor of an American Bulldog who was ordered to pay a high quality and have his canine destroyed after it attacked one other canine whereas off its leash has been refused by the Sheriff Appeal Court.
James Murdoch, the proprietor of a microchipped America Bulldog named Storm, argued that the sheriff was not entitled to make the discovering in actual fact that the canine was dangerously uncontrolled on the time of the attack, nor that the offence was aggravated when it comes to part 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.
The enchantment was heard by Sheriffs Principal Catherine Dowdalls and Gillian Wade, together with Appeal Sheriff Fiona Tait. C Neilson, advocate, appeared for the appellant and A Cameron, solicitor advocate, for the Crown.
Short house of time
After Storm attacked one other canine in January 2022, the appellant was made topic to a Dog Control Notice requiring him to maintain Storm collared and muzzled and on a set lead now not than 1.5 metres when outdoors the curtilage of his home. On 14 February 2023, after managing to flee from the appellant’s backyard, Storm attacked one other canine owned by a passerby, JS. The appellant arrived shortly thereafter and succeeded in prising Storm’s jaws aside after a wrestle of round 10 seconds.
Both JS and her canine acquired accidents, with the canine requiring veterinary therapy for puncture accidents to its head and round one eye. Police officers attended on the handle the next day and seized the canine from the appellant’s ex-wife’s handle in Crieff. On 14 September 2023, the sheriff sentenced the appellant to pay a high quality of £400; to pay a compensation order of £500 to JS; and to have Storm destroyed.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the info and circumstances spoke to a momentary and transient attack of JS’s canine by Storm, through which JS was not directly injured. The case was just like Tierney v Valentine (1995) in that the incident ended inside a brief house of time. If the conviction was upheld, a destruction order was extreme, as measures had been taken to forestall Storm from escaping the appellant’s property once more.
For the Crown it was submitted that the sheriff was proper to seek out that Storm was dangerously uncontrolled, having left the home of his personal volition with out the appellant in management. The position in Scotland was {that a} canine could possibly be seen as dangerously uncontrolled primarily based on its behaviour in a single incident, and the very first thing Storm had performed upon leaving the property was to attack one other canine.
Reasonable apprehension
Sheriff Principal Dowdalls, delivering the opinion of the courtroom, started: “The appellant submits that the facts and circumstances of this case were such that it could not be said that there was a reasonable apprehension that Storm would injure a person. We reject that submission. Where a dog has not injured a person before, that does not preclude reasonable apprehension that it might do so.”
She continued: “On the facts of this case, as found by the sheriff, we are satisfied that there were grounds for reasonable apprehension that Storm would injure a person and therefore that, in terms of section 3(1) of the 1991 Act, was dangerously out of control. It was not necessary for the sheriff to find that Storm had previously injured a person to establish reasonable apprehension.”
Noting the management measures already in place, the Sheriff Principal added: “JS was injured as a result of trying to rescue her dog. There was no need to show direct injury to JS. That is not a requirement of section 3(1) of the 1991 Act. Storm’s behaviour was sufficiently connected to JS’s injuries to establish that Storm was dangerously out of control. But for Storm’s attack upon her dog, which she tried to rescue by pulling on the lead, JS would not have suffered injury.”
She concluded: “The sheriff was entitled to hold that Storm’s attack amounted to an aggravated offence in terms of section 3(1) of the 1991 Act, to make finding in fact 13 and to convict of the aggravated offence. Having concluded that the offence was aggravated in terms of section 3(1) of the 1991 Act, the sheriff had no option but to make the order for destruction.”
The enchantment in opposition to conviction and sentence was due to this fact refused.
